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EDITORIAL
Income Distribution and the Class Struggle
Income distribution is a confusing term. What scope is it
to be given? Is it to be treated in a purely economic sense,
bringing in social and political factors only when they are
found to be useful for or obstacles to changing the income
differentials in an economy? Is the argument for changing the
distribution of income to be grounded in essentially instrumental
reasoning changing the structure of demand so as to reduce
balance of payments burdens, creating an internal market for
national industry, reducing incentives to invest in capital
intensive projects which yield little employment and enhance
political instability - or is it to find its basis in arguments
about the virtues of equality as such?
Historical experience and a number of unclarified assumpt-
ions raise some doubts the validity of the 'efficiency' arguments
in favour of income re-distribution - arguments which, it is true,
are used by writers who value equality in itself but hide this
value under instrumental reasoning because thev feel that it may
convince others who do not share their values. I have come
to believe that the difficulty of redistributing income
in a definitive fashion arises, in the long term, and apart from
the enormous initial political obstacles, from the combined
exigencies of equality and accumulation. This is borne out by the
Cuban experience and indirectly, by the present Chilean experience.
I am not at all convinced that there are sufficient resources to
redistribute in many poor countries so that the standard of living
of the lower classes will rise fairly steadily at the same time as
accumulation remains constant and the doubts are greater still if
accumulation is to increase. One must go into the arithmetic of
distribution of resources between consumption and investment after
the process of redistribution. As a corollary to this point, income
redistribution should be seen in the context of the nature of
development itself; it may well be that the pursuit of equality,
even setting aside external political effects such as blockades or
informal credit denial - but not setting aside the limits imposed
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by the structure of the world economy - makes it impossible for
a government to aspire to anything more spectacular than feeding,
clothing, housing and educating its moulation respectably,
whereas a policy of rapid growth and industrialization is
achievable only without redistribution, and without achieving
even the respectable standard of living which the egalitarian
path would achieve. One way out of this contradiction might
be found either in egalitarian regional grouPings, which shield
industries from the competition of industrial powers; also, some
individual countries, such as Brazil, may be big enough and
well enough endowed with resources to pursue an autarchic path
of development, but even China's size guarantees no easy solution.
Chinese history since 1948 shows a leadership grappling with
these problems and appearing to have found no definitive answer,
oscillating between industrial and agricultural emDhasis in their
policies.
We must learn to be hard-headed, if not wary, and we can
learn this from the political process of redistribution by left
wing governments such as the first years of the Cuban Revolution
or the present situation in Chile. In both cases one sees quite
clearly the extraordinary difficulties which pile up during the
initial stages, and how secondary effects (such as canitalsts
and landlords going on strike, balance of payments difficulties
arising from a cessation of incoming foreign investment and food
imports to satisfy growing demand from those exneriencing wage
rises in the lowest income groups) force the government to take
certain crucial decisions which then have substantial long-term
consequences. The process of structural change itself, if it
goes deep, may involve heavy costs in terms of useless plant,
arising from changes in the structure of demand, and reorient-
ation of imports due to formal or informal sanctions. Unavoidable,
though perhaps undesirable, short-term decisions have substantial
long-term effects, whether they reverse, halt or radicalize a
process.
It is not enough simply to proclaim 'income redistribution:'
the arithmetic of the process must be carefully worked out so
that the limitations of such a policy, and the constraints it
places on long-term trends in incomes and on accumulation are
made quite clear.
* * *
Differentials in income reproduce themselves in spheres of
social activity other than shopping: education, access to admin-
administrative and political institutions and so on. The Teodels
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we use, do not as yet include these elements in more than a marginal
way, and lay insufficient emphasis on the imPortance of the social
and economic relationshins between income grouns Yet the dynamics
of income distribution lie nrecisely in these relationships, in
relationships of domination and exnloitation, and indeed of
bargaining. From such an assumPtion it follows that changes in
income distribution arise when the relative bargaining strength
of classes or grouPs changes, through the rise of a trade union
movement, for example, or through important changes in the
economic structure such as a sudden and definitive fall in the
world price of a commodity.
Thus, when we speak of changes in the distribution of income,
we must also sneak of class conflict and of the organization of
those whom we consider to be denrived in society.
The role of trade unions raises narticularly complicated
problems of both analysis and values in this context. It has
recently become fashionable to speak of unions as the rePresent-
atives of a privileged minority, both within the working class
and in society as a whole. Yet the meaning and significance of
such statements varies a great deal. In the first glace we must
distinguish between decrees of nrivilege: in some societies
(Colombian society, for example) the unions get on very well with
management, and rePresent but a tiny fraction of the industrial
labour force; yet they also rePresent that fraction which works
in the most advanced sector, that fraction which has a coincidence
of interest with management in maintaining the leading technolo-
gical role of that sector and excluding other workers from it.
In other situations unionized workers in general may be relatively
better paid, but they are not such a small minority, and they are
not so evidently set anart from the unorganized industrial
working class. Clearly, arguments about reducing the power of the
unions in the interests of job-creation are of varying relevance
in these two situations.
We must ask further who is to benefit from a reduction of the
power of the trade unions. Where the class structure of Society
is not undergoing substantial change, it is likely that the only
people to gain will be the capitalists; they will rofit by the
reduced bargaining power pf their workers, but will most probably
not reduce investments in labour-saving plant, for even if this
might enlarge their already substantial profits (and I think here
of Latin America in narticular), it would bring problems of human
management which they would nrefer to avoid: "machines", they will
say, "are easier to control than men". Those who claim that the
reduction of the bargaining power of existing trade unions,
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however privileged, will lead to a reduction in unemployment in
the absence of other structural changes are either defending the
interests of the privileged, or making mistaken assunitions. This
is particularly relevant in the context of Dudley Seers' article
in this issue, for the interests of governments involved in
distributing 'aid' would in some situations be well served by
a strategy which, on the pretext of reducing unemployment, both
maintained the existing level of technologically advanced immorts,
and reduced the power of the trade unions.
However, when profound structural change is the order of
the day, the picture changes somewhat.. If the unemployed, the
"marginals", do acquire increased bargaining power, at the
expense both of a capitalist class and of a highly privileged
labour elite, if the question is not only one of reducing the
power of existing trade unions, but also one of transforming
them or creating new organizations of the poorest strata of
society, then there might be some guarantee that the total
number of jobs would increase and that the structure of imports
would be drastically changed. The Chinese strategy, with all
its vacillations and despite our ignorance, seems to be closer
to the second of these situations - yet what hope would a
government such as that of the Peonle's Republic have of
receiving aid, if indeed it was wanted, and if aid was relevant
to the pursuit of its objectives?
Egalitarianism was, of course, present in some form or
another in the study of underdeveloment, even before the notion
of "closing the gap between rich and poor" became the common
coinage of UN resolutions and papal encyclicals. But now that
it has become so intrinsic a part of the ideology of domestic
development we must guard against two dangers of mystification.
We must remember that the revolution is not the end, but the
beginning of a road, and that once embarked upon a nrocess of
redistribution of income and power, a political leadership is
faced by severe constraints and by problems to which the
solutions are far from self-evident: Fidel Castro may spend a lot
of time calling for revolution, but he snends an equal amount
of time pointing Out how he has learnt, painfully, that real
problems start once the revolutionary leadership has taken
power. At the sanie time we must guard against dangers of
mystification from the right, from those who find in an ideology
of equality a useful weapon with which to defend their interests
and their privileges. I hope that this issue of the Bulitin
makes a small contribution to the creation of an atmosphere of
both hard-headedness and commitment in the study of under-
development.
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